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The Influence of Military Considerations on the 1869 
Reichsvolksschulgesetz in Imperial Austria 
Lukas Grawe* 
Abstract: »Der Einfluss von militärischen Überlegungen auf das Reichsvolks-
schulgesetz von 1869 im Kaisertum Österreich«. On July 3, 1866, Prussian 
troops defeated their Austrian opponents at Königgratz, thereby deciding the 
German “fratricidal war.” The defeat of the Austrian Empire came as a surprise 
to many contemporaries because the Austrian army was previously regarded as 
much more powerful. Searching for the causes, one reason was mentioned as a 
decisive factor in the public discussion: the poorer education of the Austrian 
soldiers when compared to those of the Prussians. Finally Prussia had a well-
functioning school obligation, while the school system in Austria had numerous 
deficiencies. The slogan of the “Prussian schoolmaster,” who had defeated his 
Austrian counterpart, led the Austrian military to demand the introduction of 
compulsory schooling from the political leadership. Improved schooling should 
thus increase the efficiency of the army. In 1869, the Austrian parliament final-
ly passed the Reichsvolksschulgesetz, which introduced eight-year compulsory 
schooling. The article examines the military influence on development, drafting 
and enforcement of the law and thus analyzes its impact on the evolution of 
the Austrian educational policy. 
Keywords: Austro-Prussian War, education, compulsory schooling, Austrian 
military, Reichsvolksschulgesetz. 
1. Introduction 
“Casca il mondo” – “The world collapses” (Schulze 1992, 347): with this strik-
ing phrase a high dignitary of the Vatican summarized the outcome of the 
Battle of Königgrätz. The fighting ended on July 3, 1866 and – surprisingly for 
much of the European public – with a victory of the Prussian troops over the 
Austrian-Saxon army, thereby deciding the German “fratricidal war.” The 
war’s unexpected result initiated a major change of power in the heart of Eu-
rope. It ended the more than one hundred years of dualism between the Empire 
of Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia and paved the way for a German unifi-
cation in the sense of a “kleindeutsche Lösung” (“Lesser Germany”). Domesti-
cally and militarily, the defeat of the Austrian Empire was a cesura. It led to the 
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settlement with Hungary in 1867, thus establishing the Habsburg Dual Monar-
chy and, at the end of 1866, was the main reason for Austria to introduce gen-
eral conscription (Bremm 2016). 
How could it have happened that the Habsburg army, which up to then had 
been seen as the strongest military power in Central Europe, clearly emerged as 
the loser of the fight over supremacy in Germany? This question occupied the 
minds of the Austrian public, politicians, and high-ranking officers after having 
heard the news from the battlefield. In addition to the technological inferiority, 
poorer leadership, less structured organization, and the previous reduction of 
the army’s size (Allmayer-Beck 1987, 44-60), one decisive reason for the de-
feat was mentioned in many newspaper articles: the poorer education of the 
Austrian soldiers. Prussia had a well-functioning compulsory education system, 
while the Austrian model had many shortcomings. In hardly any part of the 
Empire did more than half of the school-age children take part in class every 
day, two-thirds of the Austrian soldiers were illiterate (Engelbrecht 1986, 112). 
The increased importance of ever more complicated weaponry and the systemic 
changes of the face of war called for autonomous soldiers with a basic educa-
tion. More than ever, interlocking compulsory education and general conscrip-
tion guaranteed the establishment of a victorious army (Becker 2001, 140). 
Only two weeks after the Battle of Königgrätz, on July 17, 1866, the Saxon 
geographer Oscar Peschel outlined this interdependence for the first time. In his 
essay “Die Lehren der jüngsten Kriegsgeschichte” (“The lessons of recent war 
history”), he attributed a crucial importance to education and wrote: “We now 
want to show, that the Prussians’ defeat of the Austrians was a victory of the 
Prussian schoolmasters over the Austrian schoolmasters.” For this reason, he 
argued, Austria had to cultivate the spirit of its subjects in order to restore the 
country to its old greatness (Peschel 1866, 695).1 One day later, the Austrian 
newspaper Neue Freie Presse picked up Peschel’s statements, printed extensive 
excerpts,2 and thus ensured their dissemination throughout the Empire.3 
The notion of the Prussian soldiers’ superior intelligence and education also 
spread within their own kingdom (Becker 2001, 152-6). Prussian teachers 
quickly picked up the argument and demanded wage increases as a recognition 
for their service to the fatherland.4 Even the Prussian government announced in 
an 1867 official gazette:  
                                                             
1  Peschel further wrote: “Mathematics is the grindstone, and in this sense one may say that 
the Prussian schoolmasters triumphed over the Austrian in the first section of the Bohemian 
campaign.” Following Peschel, coincidence, greater morality, or better armament played on-
ly a minor meaning. 
2  “Lehren aus dem Kriege“, Neue Freie Presse, no. 676 (July 18, 1866). 
3  On July 19, the newspaper Das Vaterland. Zeitung für die österreichische Monarchie printed 
Peschel‘s article also in excerpts. See no. 168 (July 19, 1866). 
4  The reason for the demands of the teachers was: “Through a gloriously conducted war, the 
Prussian state has become larger in area and richer in glory, and the whole world marvels at 
 
HSR 45 (2020) 2  │  145 
It has been admiringly said everywhere, that our army achieved last summer’s 
unexpected success mainly because of the spiritual education and efficiency 
flowing through every individual. The most important experts of all countries 
have unanimously declared, that the miraculous success was based not only on 
the excellence of our weapons, but on the insight with which our crews knew 
how to use them, not only on the magnificence of the orders, but also on the 
self-sufficient wisdom and prudence with which the orders were executed, not 
only on the excellence of the leadership, but on the soldiers’ immediate under-
standing of what was important at every moment, and on their correct grasp of 
every favorable circumstance which offered itself up. These qualities, as well 
as the loyalty, the obedience, the efficient discipline of man, which has proven 
itself even in enemy territory, can only exist with a good education at their 
base.5 
Even before the war with Prussia, the Imperial government had recognized the 
many shortcomings of Austria’s education system. As early as November 3, 
1863, the House of Representatives called on the Ministry of State to draw up a 
new school law. However, not much happened until the war with Prussia 
(Vierzig Jahre Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1909, 9-11). The Austrian school sys-
tem was merely “a measure to educate the people and adapted to an absolutist 
form of government.” (Klein 1967, 298) Its essential guidelines had already 
been laid down in the “Political School Constitution” of 1805, and the 1855 
Concordat between Austria and the Vatican added important amendments. In 
theory, these two laws did establish several meaningful provisions. The reality, 
however, strongly deviated from this positive impression. In addition to a very 
lax execution of compulsory education, an extremely high number of students 
per class and inadequate classrooms, especially the poor training of the teach-
ers, proved to be detrimental. The Concordat granted the church school super-
vision, the Austrian state on the other hand was left with no space for interven-
tion. Lastly, the Concordat limited teaching stuff to a minimum, so in many 
places school lessons were based on the social background of the students. In 
doing so, it promoted an anachronistic class mentality, making it difficult to 
ascend from lower milieus (Vierzig Jahre Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1909, 35-50; 
Mikschy 1949, 5-8, 45-8; Jellouschek 1969). Considering these numerous 
drawbacks, it is not surprising that the liberal faculty had advocated for an 
educational reform for many years. For them, the Concordat was an obstacle to 
achieving this goal. “Much, very much has been irretrievably lost because of 
                                                                                                                                
the heroic courage of the Prussian nation in arms. The school, however, believes that it con-
tributed considerably to these rare successes, by enabling the enthusiasm for King and Fa-
therland and by empower their sons to defeat an enemy who had remained behind in cul-
ture by the intelligent use of their weapons.” “Pädagogische Rundschau,“ Freie 
Pädagogische Blätter, no. 2 (January 12, 1867): 27. 
5  “Die preußische Volksschule und der letzte Krieg,“ Amts-Blatt der Königlichen Regierung zu 
Stralsund, no. 12 (March 21, 1867): 81. 
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the Concordat,” the Freie Pädagogische Blätter wrote after the defeat against 
Prussia:  
The blood of our soldiers, which drenched the soil of Bohemia and Italy, our 
centuries-old union with maternal Germany – both of these, in addition to 
many other things, were sacrificed for that pact and its consequences. Without 
a Concordat Austria would have suffered no Königgrätz, no Nikolsburg, with-
out the Concordat our troops would still be masters of Northern Italy today.6  
But how significant did Austria’s military and political decision-makers think 
education was in ensuring their defeat? Numerous military authorities, includ-
ing the commander of the victorious Prussian troops, Helmuth von Moltke, 
attributed the Prussian victory after the Battle of Königgrätz to the superior 
military education of the Prussian soldiers7 and the technological superiority of 
the Prussian army, excluding general education as a deciding factor. Neverthe-
less, the powerful slogan of the “Prussian schoolmasters” persisted. The fol-
lowing article explains, to what extent the inadequate education system and its 
military effects were part of the military and political discourses and which 
measures for the improvement of the school system were proposed by the army 
and by politicians. It can certainly be assumed that the Austrian military was a 
relevant actor in educational politics (Obinger and Kovacevic 2016; Tantner 
2005). As noted in the study “Education and Military Rivalry” published in 
2012, education benefits from international military rivalries and the prepara-
tion of armed conflict (Aghion, Persson, and Rouzet 2012). In the run-up to the 
First World War, the “multi-ethnic character” of the Habsburg army also influ-
enced the Empire’s education (Hämmerle 2007) and made it a factor in “social 
armaments” (Obinger and Kovacevic 2016, 119). The present survey, however, 
begins earlier and deals with the time immediately before and after the war 
between Austria and Prussia. Thus, the focus will be on the army’s attitude 
towards the Reichsvolksschulgesetz (Imperial Elementary School Law), which 
was adopted in 1869 to improve the much-criticized Austrian education sys-
tem. The last aspect that will be discussed is whether the Austrian military, or 
whether military arguments used by politicians, contributed significantly to the 
emergence and adoption of the new law. 
                                                             
6  A. Chr. Jessen, “Der Anfang vom Ende,“ Freie Pädagogische Blätter, no. 24 (June 15, 1867): 
369-70, here 369. 
7  Thus, Moltke emphasized in a parliamentary speech of February 16, 1874: “It has been said 
that the schoolmaster won our battles. – Gentlemen, mere knowledge does not yet elevate a 
man to the point where he is prepared to risk his life for an idea, for duty, for honor and 
country; this includes the whole education of man. Not the schoolmaster, but the educator, 
the rank has won our battles, he who has now soon raised sixty years of nationhood to 
physical strength and spiritual freshness, to order and punctuality, to loyalty and obedience, 
to patriotism and manliness.” Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deut-
schen Reichstages, 2. Legislaturperiode, I. Session 1874, vol. 1, 80. 
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2. The Military Discourse in Professional Journals 
Although the deficiencies of the education system had already been recognized 
within Austrian military circles before the war against Prussia began, it did not 
play a major role in public discourse. The Militär-Zeitung for example printed 
a speech by the Member of Parliament Dr. Nepomuk Berger in which he high-
lighted the numerous shortcomings within the Austrian school system. Despite 
all efforts for the better, he saw education as  
still very insufficient in many provinces. In the year 1857 in Lombardy-
Venetia 33, in Dalmatia 23, in Galicia 22, and in Bukovina only 10 pupils out 
of 100 attended the lower elementary schools, although in all these regions the 
ratio of schools and teachers to pupils is much more favorable than in the 
German provinces.8 
The Austrian army was particularly interested in training rudimentarily educat-
ed recruits to be faithful, patriotic, and loyal soldiers. Officers repeatedly vent-
ed their feelings in magazines, criticizing the male adolescents’ inadequate 
preparation for their time as soldiers. It is often nothing more than a “pious 
wish” that the elementary schools give their students a sense of duty, patriot-
ism, and moral values, one author wrote. “In reality, oftentimes men come to us 
in a condition, not necessarily of the lowest moral development, but of com-
plete ignorance of what is required for the foundation of our military and moral 
building. The elementary school has done nothing to support the troop educa-
tors in their already difficult task.”9 The army claimed that it was the one insti-
tution ensuring the true, sustainable education of Austria’s men, thereby fend-
ing off the accusation of being a “raw Soldateska” (pack of soldiers). It was 
rather  
the pinnacle of education for those thousands who come every year, mentally 
and physically neglected, and start their military service […], only to return 
home after a few years as well-mannered people, taught to cherish structure 
and cleanliness and with the knowledge of law and order in their hearts!10 
Among other things, the educational conditions within the Military Border, 
which was under military administration, substantiated this claim. Although the 
educational institutions in this area remained far behind those in the German-
Austrian parts of the country, they distinguished themselves from the adjacent 
                                                             
8  “Dr. Berger in der 24. Sitzung des niederösterreichischen Landtages am 3. März 1863,“ 
Militär-Zeitung, vol. 16, no. 21 (March 14, 1863): 161-3, here 163. 
9  “Gedanken über die Pflege des moralischen Elements in unserer Armee,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 
18, no. 85 (October 25, 1865): 701-2, here 701. 
10  “Militärisch-politische Zeitfragen,“ von einem süddeutschen Offizier a. D., Militär-Zeitung, 
vol. 19, no. 16 (February 24, 1866): 121-4, here 121. 
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provinces such as Croatia-Slavonia – a fact that the military statistician Gustav 
Adolf Schimmer attributed to the favorable influence of the Austrian military.11 
At this point, however, the vast majority of military authors did not believe 
that education had a decisive effect on a battle’s outcome. A comprehensive 
humanistic education was therefore considered unnecessary. After all, the work 
of the soldier would be a practical matter. Therefore one should only  
teach the recruit what is absolutely essential and constitutes a true soldier; but 
those called to serve, who in the most part do not have the slightest practice in 
thinking independently, have been taught a large amount of unnecessary 
things of which they only remember bits and pieces.12  
Instead of long marching exercises, which would increase the body’s condition 
and steel it, Austria apparently preferred it when “man spends half a day sitting 
on the school bench with a crooked back, and therefore can hardly lift his 
shoulder after wearing the knapsack for several hours.”13 
In summary, the military especially criticized Austria’s national education 
for its failures in training the young recruits’ character and physique. However, 
this naming of grievances did not mean that representatives of the Austrian 
army had demanded a comprehensive educational reform. On the contrary: In 
their mind, the recruits’ physical abilities were being wasted away during long 
school terms. Instead of demanding reform, efforts were made to promote the 
teaching of conscientiousness and patriotism. For this reason, rumors circulat-
ing in the Viennese coffee houses in 1866 of a great difference in the educa-
tional level between the Austrian and the allied Saxon troops did not bother the 
Austrian army leadership (Mikschy 1949, 8). 
The defeat against Prussia did however trigger profound changes within mil-
itary discussions. The military observers largely agreed in their search for the 
causes of defeat and in the lessons to be learned from the experience, with a 
few exceptions (Wagner 1971, 56). While an anonymous author in the Öster-
reichische Militärische Zeitschrift did not classify the Prussian victory as “the 
victory of intelligence over brute force” and instead blamed it on an erroneous 
deployment, fragmentation of forces, hesitant and inactive leadership, and 
inferior tactics,14 other military officials held the inadequate educational system 
responsible for the crushing defeat. Although the impact of a “developed mind” 
would count “too little to avert or bring about catastrophes,” they saw the Aus-
trian’s poor education as at worst “the lowest of the decisive factors,” but 
                                                             
11  Schimmer, Gustav Adolf, “Das Schulwesen in der k.k. österreichischen Militärgrenze, im 
Vergleiche zu jenem der Monarchie und zu Civil-Croatien insbesondere.“ Österreichische 
Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 2, tome 5, (1861): 72-86, 119-31. 
12  “Gedankenpläne und Lesefrüchte,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 15, no. 28, (April 5, 1862): 118. 
13  “Gedankenpläne und Lesefrüchte,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 15, no. 28, (April 5, 1862): 118. 
14  “Über die Ursachen und Misserfolge bei der österreichischen Nordarmee im Kriege Preussens 
gegen Deutschland im Jahre 1866,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 7, tome 2 
(1866): 341-61. 
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thought the advantage of “a well-educated corps of recruits is large enough to 
demand, that in the future the elementary school educates all adolescents, thor-
oughly teaches them the basics in healthy and well-lit rooms, promotes the 
general development of their mental abilities and logical thinking, educates 
them morally and supports their physical development through gymnastics.” 
After all, a higher education increased the effectiveness of military training.15 
Another anonymous author called for an improvement in the current educa-
tional system in a detailed series of articles. War opponent Prussia should be 
regarded as an archetype:  
How much time has passed since it [Prussia] renounced absolutism, and yet its 
education has not been disregarded, on the contrary, we have had sufficient 
opportunity to acknowledge how much the Prussian elementary school has 
done for the individual, for the soldier with a rifle in his hand. Not only was 
he able to use his weapon with clever calculation, he was able to possess an 
active demeanor. All these combined arguments form a most eloquent plea for 
the improve- and development of education.16  
The Prussian soldiers are consistently more independent than the Austrian, 
concluded another anonymous military author. The fighting of the Prussians 
proved that “they paid more attention to the thoughts of each commander’s 
spirit than to brute force or strict order, this was the cause of their tactical suc-
cesses. To be sure, in Austria it is not as easy to leave space for ideas, because 
the countries’ intelligence has not progressed as far as Prussia’s.” Consequent-
ly, the author called for a reform of the educational system. Intelligence should 
be “nurtured throughout the nation by means of a more adequate and wide-
spread education of the people, so as to implant a specific set of ideas into the 
mind of the masses and every individual within them.”17 
Another author also criticized the soldiers’ lack of an active demeanor and 
independence. This “lack of military intelligence” made it difficult to learn new 
tactics, which have to attend to the increased firepower, because these tactics 
rely on independent soldiers. In the Battle of Königgrätz, the Austrian soldiers 
had often advanced in closed lines to attack the enemy with the bayonet. The 
result of this antiquated tactic was high losses amid Prussia’s hail of bullets 
(Allmayer-Beck 1987, 56). In fact, the Austrian military leadership did not 
believe that their troops, which consisted largely of uneducated farmers, could 
learn and implement a more complex tactic (Déak 1991, 67). That the “warfare 
of ‘Hurray!’ failed against that of the intelligentsia,” as the Austrian general 
                                                             
15  “Unsere Aufgabe,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 7, tome 4 (1866): 34-46, here 
36-7. 
16  “Des verwichenen Jahres neue Folge,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 73 (September 18, 1867): 
587-90, here 589. 
17  “Noch einmal über unsere militärischen Mißerfolge,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 6 (January 
23, 1867): 45-6. 
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Karl Moering noted in his diary,18 seemed to be clear to the anonymous mili-
tary author. So, he argued, the Austrian soldiers’ low level of education had a 
negative impact on other sectors as well. Therefore, it had proven difficult to 
employ the numerous technical innovations of the age appropriately and organ-
ize them properly because of the army’s “spellbound mental elements and 
laborers” standing in the way of putting them to a meaningful use.19 
Statistical figures often substantiated the education system’s urgent need for 
reforms. Another article stressed, that although literacy rates were at 96.2 per-
cent in Lower Austria, 89.3 in Upper Austria, 68.1 in Bohemia, 62 in Silesia, 
and 60 percent in Salzburg, Styria was the only other Austrian province to 
reach a rate of more than 50 percent. In Hungary, only 24.2 percent of con-
scripts, and in Carinthia only 20.4 percent, could read and write and the situa-
tion looked even more alarming in other parts of the Empire. In Galicia and 
Bukovina, for example, only 4.5 percent of conscripted men could read and 
write; in Dalmatia, the figure was even at 0.8 percent. These numbers clearly 
showed “how much, especially in the east and south, remains to be done for the 
schools.”20 
Military men did not confine their criticism of Austrian soldiers’ deficient 
education to the journals; it also appeared in independent publications. An 
anonymous writer’s study, published in Vienna in 1867, came to similar con-
clusions as previous journal articles had:  
The higher intelligence has triumphed, the Prussian schoolmaster has beaten 
the Austrian, this is the dazzling dictum which has now become the general 
verdict of last year’s campaign [...]. We cannot deny the justification of this 
conviction – for the needle-gun is also a result of this intelligence. 
At the same time, however, the author refused to see the improvement of na-
tional education as a universal remedy. After all, the neglected education sys-
tem was “the least cause for our failures and intellectual skills are the smallest 
of our soldierly deficiencies” (Erinnerungen an die Tage des Unheils 1867, 7). 
The study was not limited to the subject of education, but also held the infe-
rior armament, the army’s inadequate organization, and the inability of the 
Austrian military leaders responsible for the defeat (ibid., 21). Thus, the anon-
ymous author did not advocate for the introduction of a better educational 
system. It is true, he wrote, that nobody recognizes  
                                                             
18  Diary entry from Moering, July 17, 1866, reprinted in: Wandruszka, Schicksalsjahr 1866 
(1966): 270. 
19  “Ideen über die Mittel zur Heranbildung der für den Bedarf einer Armee in Österreich von 
der in neuester Zeit postulierten Stärke – nahezu einer Million Soldaten – nöthigen Anzahl 
intelligenter Ober- und Unteroffiziere,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 8, tome 
1, (1867): 175-82, here 175-6. 
20  Sehr, “Heeresergänzung in Italien 1865 im Vergleiche zu jener von Oesterreich,“ Militär-
Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 73 (September 18, 1867): 590-1, here 591. 
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the high value of national education for state and society more than we do; no 
one yearns more than us for the time in which we can hand over the rules of 
self-study to the ordinary soldier; we are also fully convinced that it is irrefu-
tably necessary for lieutenants to study, in order to later become leaders, who 
do not invite new ignominy into the army and the nation; – but this seed’s 
harvest is reserved for a later time, we need an immediate remedy now, we 
have no time to expect the Holy Spirit to enlighten us, because the worst can 
face us again tomorrow. (ibid., 19-20) 
What one needed above all right now was the “strengthening of character” and 
the “enhancement of morality; because that of intelligence is the result of 
years” (ibid., 43-4). 
Another anonymous author, quoted in the same study, also emphasized per-
sonal qualities that had to be nurtured and cared for. “They, together with 
heightened intelligence, should form the fertile soil from which laurel trees will 
grow, that will then tower over those of the Prussians at Königgrätz or the 
French at Solferino” (ibid., 67). That the two anonymous writings were widely 
received seems certain, especially since excerpts were published in the Militär-
Zeitung, which characterized the book as “a small but very readable paper.”21 
The Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift also gave the study a positive 
review and explicitly singled it out among the flood of other publications.22 
There was a broad consensus regarding the undervaluation of the education-
al basics needed for warfare as one reason for defeat, but the responsible mili-
tary circles disagreed on how these grievances could be remedied (Wagner 
1971, 56). Promoting the future officers’ character development did not seem 
to be enough for Austria’s army leadership. That is why, at first, they hoped to 
start resolving the crisis by introducing universal military conscription. Minis-
ter of War Franz von John advocated this strategy in a lecture before Emperor 
Franz Joseph on December 26, 1866 (Allmayer-Beck 1987, 61; Hämmerle 
2007, 227-8). In addition to a comprehensive school reform, the defeat of Kö-
niggrätz could also justify reforming the army, he said. In his remarks, John 
also referred to the low level of education within the army, mostly agreeing 
with the general opinion expressed in the military discourse. According to him, 
one should not hope that introducing compulsory military service would “im-
mediately supply the army with that quantity of intelligence it requires, and of 
which it will only benefit if national education, without which nothing extraor-
dinary can be achieved, is generally brought to a higher level.” John thought it 
likely, that the school reform’s positive effects would take several years to 
materialize. Therefore, the Austrian army should be “the first weapon school of 
                                                             
21  “Erinnerungen an die Tage des Unheils,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, nos. 84 and 85 (October 26 
and 30, 1867). 
22  Reviews for “Erinnerungen an die Tage des Unheils,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 
vol. 8, tome 3 (1867): 335-6. 
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the nation,” which could support the civil branches in educating the male popu-
lation.23 
Although accompanied by fierce disputes, general conscription was finally 
introduced in both parts of the monarchy. This caused the discussion about 
national education to continue to gain momentum. An anonymous author called 
for the adaptation of the educational system to the new structure of the army. 
After all, in a system with general military service “the children’s teacher 
should work for the soldier, and the future military leader should in turn work 
for the sake of national education. Expert knowledge is not supposed to be 
confined to a caste. Education for state purposes should become a priority.” For 
this reason, the author of the short article advocated for the introduction of a 
seminar for teachers and a coordination body, which would organize the vari-
ous branches of the educational system.24 
The same arguments were made in the book Ueber Reorganisierung der 
Militär-Bildungs-Anstalten (On Reorganization of Military Education Institu-
tions), which was anonymously published in 1868 by the influential Field Mar-
shal Lieutenant and later Minister of War Franz Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld. There-
in, Kuhn called for a comprehensive reform of the military educational system, 
which he saw as inevitable because of general conscription and the associated 
Verbürgerlichung (bourgeoisification) of the army. Military academies should, 
“first of all mold humans and then soldiers.” He added that “military education 
should be more interrelated with that of other citizens.” To achieve this, officer 
candidates should receive a broader humanistic education.25 Consequently, 
Valentin Ritter von Streffleur, the publisher of the Österreichische Militärische 
Zeitschrift, personally advocated for the establishment of a seminar for the 
military’s instructors.26 Starting in 1867/68, numerous “military scientific asso-
ciations” were founded in Vienna; their goal: promoting strategic and tactical 
training and lessons in military history (Allmayer-Beck 1987, 70). 
Progressive endeavors notwithstanding, the calls for increased training of 
the recruits’ character and physical fitness remained persistent. Captain Frei-
herr von Mayerhofer, in his lecture entitled “Das Volk in Waffen und seine 
Erziehung” (“The people in arms and their education”), advocated for the in-
troduction of military youth education and the establishment of gymnastics and 
                                                             
23  Lecture of the Minister of War Franz von John, December 28, 1866, reprinted in: Kaiserliche 
Verordnung vom 28. Dezember 1866 über die allgemeine Wehrpflicht (Prague: 1868), 9-14, 
here 12. 
24  “Das Unterrichtswesen und die allgemeine Wehrpflicht“, Österreichische Militärische Zeit-
schrift, vol. 9, tome 4 (1868): 288. 
25  “Ueber Reorganisierung der Militär-Bildungs-Anstalten,“ 1868, cited in: Allmayer-Beck, Die 
bewaffnete Macht (1987), 65-6. 
26  “Über die Errichtung eines Militär Lehrer-Seminars. (Eine Skizze.),“ Österreichische Militäri-
sche Zeitschrift, vol. 8, tome 1 (1867): 239-40. 
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sports in elementary schools. He additionally criticized the current state these 
schools were in.  
In accordance with all schools of antiquity, physical education should go hand 
in hand with the cognitive, and the children – especially those of the poor fac-
tory population, coming out of their dull living rooms – should not be crowd-
ed together in dusty classrooms for hours, but rather be encouraged to move 
and strengthen their bodies outside in the free, healthy air.27  
He also demanded that the elementary schools provide a spiritual military 
education and introduce lessons teaching patriotism, which should above all 
convey values such as loyalty and a sense of duty.28 These demands were by no 
means new, as a look at the discussions preceding 1866 shows. 
Numerous authors, such as the journalist and former military writer Her-
mann Ritter von Orges, saw the army, rather than the elementary schools, as 
the true “school of the nation” (Hämmerle 2007, 228): “That no school is as 
excellently suited to the school of life as the army, that no teacher is so effec-
tive in guiding the pupil and promoting his development, like that of the of-
ficer, need scarcely any proof.”29 No measure was more suited to compensating 
the lack of schools and teachers than military service. Nevertheless, it would be 
very valuable “if every recruit would bring with him a certain amount of basic 
knowledge.” Assuming the school and lessons were to be perfected in the fu-
ture, they would serve as a useful supplement to the army’s training.30 Orges 
suggested rewarding well-educated men by offering to cut their time in school 
for the army’s sake. He thereby hoped to encourage more citizens to strive for 
and acquire basic knowledge.31 
Such proposals were accompanied by demands for the introduction of the 
one-year volunteer institute. In his 1866 speech addressed to the Emperor, 
Minister of War John had already emphasized that “the army, in addition to an 
increase of its numbers, requires intelligence, which until now it has lacked due 
mostly to statutory exemption.”32 After all, it was obvious that a modern con-
script army could not work without the intellectual potential of the nation 
(Allmayer-Beck 1987, 76). As an officer wrote in retrospect, it was precisely 
                                                             
27  Mayerhofer, “Das Volk in Waffen und seine Erziehung,“ Neue Militär-Zeitung, no. 10 (Febru-
ary 3, 1869): 81-2. 
28  Mayerhofer, “Das Volk in Waffen und seine Erziehung,“ Neue Militär-Zeitung, nos. 11 and 12 
(February 6 and 10, 1869): 91-2, 102-4. 
29  Orges, Hermann Ritter von, "Die volkswirthschaftliche Bedeutung der allgemeinen Wehr-
pflicht,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 36 (May 8, 1867): 290. 
30  Orges, Hermann Ritter von, "Die volkswirthschaftliche Bedeutung der allgemeinen Wehr-
pflicht,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 36 (May 8, 1867): 290. 
31  Orges, Hermann Ritter von, “Die volkswirthschaftliche Bedeutung der allgemeinen Wehr-
pflicht,“ Militär-Zeitung, vol. 20, no. 37 (May 11, 1867): 297. 
32  Lecture of the Minister of War Franz von John, December 28, 1866, reprinted in: Kaiserliche 
Verordnung vom 28. Dezember 1866 über die allgemeine Wehrpflicht (Prague: 1868), 9-14, 
here 10. 
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the purpose of the one-year volunteer institute “to offer the intelligent, young 
people, who are suitable for military service, the opportunity […] to acquire the 
scientific education they need in only one year, whereas the great majority 
needs three years” (ibid., 77). If a recruit visited a grammar school or an upper 
secondary school, he had to spend only one year in the army instead of the 
mandatory three-year service, and could subsequently become a reserve officer 
(Engelbrecht 1986, 13-6; Allmayer-Beck 1987, 76-9). However, as the further 
development up to the First World War would show, the new institution was 
only partially successful in encouraging the “intelligence” of the nation to serve 
within the Austrian army. 
In summary, it is obvious that the grievances of the Austrian education sys-
tem were certainly discussed within military circles. The Austrian soldiers’ low 
level of education was seen as partly responsible for the defeat against Prussia, 
even though most writers were reluctant to speak of it as a decisive disad-
vantage. Consequently, demands for the expansion of the civil educational 
system were articulated, but only got limited attention. They went hand in hand 
with calls for the introduction of general conscription. Apart from the demands 
for the expansion of sole military spheres, such as the introduction of new rifles 
and a new army organization, tactical innovations, and the expansion of rail-
way lines,33 there was no consensus on promoting education. The military 
focused its attention on their own educational institutions, which were to be 
opened to include humanistic curriculums. In addition, demands for better 
moral and physical education of the youth, which had dominated discussions 
before 1866, persisted.  
3.  The Reichsvolksschulgesetz – an Immediate 
Consequence of Königgrätz? 
Although the Austrian House of Representatives had already made initial de-
mands for a reform of the educational system at the end of 1863, hardly any-
thing happened in the following years to improve the unsatisfactory situation. 
Only the defeat against Prussia gave the Austrian government new impetus and 
thus accelerated the drawing up of improvements (Vierzig Jahre Reichsvolkss-
chulgesetz 1909, 10). Far-reaching reforms finally seemed feasible. Following 
the December constitution, the Austrian government lead by Prime Minister 
Karl von Auersperg began its work. The liberal cabinet was largely composed 
of commoners and therefore quickly got the nickname “Bürgerministerium” 
(Citizens’ Ministry; Mazohl 2016, 411-5). 
                                                             
33  “Die österreichische Armee der Zukunft,“ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, vol. 9, tome 
1 (1868): 123-42. 
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Initially, Austria’s leading politicians had to lay the foundations for a new 
school law. A handwritten letter from the Kaiser, dated March 2, 1867, reinsti-
tuted the Ministry of Education, which was dissolved in 1860 (Bundesministe-
rium für Unterricht 1948, 15). On December 30, 1867, Leopold Hasner von 
Artha assumed the position of head of the ministry and declared the improve-
ment of the Austrian educational system as the main objective of his term in 
office. Looking back at his tenure, he stated:  
My first idea when I took up office was to inspect the Austrian educational 
system from the bottom up. The basis of the entire building, the elementary 
school, was particularly in need of reform, and although there were some is-
sues in the middle and high schools which urgently needed solving, we had to 
start by reforming elementary schools to reach that level, which had produced 
excellent results in other civilized nations. (Battista 1948, 14) 
The December Constitution of December 21, 1867, granted the state the right 
to supervise the educational system, thereby eroding a crucial part of the 1855 
Concordat. Based on this premise, Auersperg began to implement the reforms 
he considered most urgent. With the “Gesetz über die Regelung des Verhältnis-
ses zwischen Kirche und Staat” (“Law on the Regulation of the Relationship 
between Church and State”) of May 25, 1868, the Austrian government created 
the necessary legal foundations (Vierzig Jahre Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1909, 
22-3; Battista 1948, 13-4; Mikschy 1949, 8), the preconditions for an educa-
tional reform were established. Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Ernst von Feuchtersleben, together with Ministerial Counsellors Franz 
Exner and Adolf Beer, devised a “Draft of the Principles of Public Education in 
Austria,” which was the basis for all further efforts (Hönigmann 1969, 653). In 
the course of the preparatory work, the first versions were sent to educational 
experts, and their suggestions for improvements were taken into account in 
further drafts.34 Unfortunately, there are no files in the Austrian State Archive 
that provide information about the development of the first drafts of the 
Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Additionally, a fire destroyed the relevant minutes of 
the Council of Ministers.35 It can be shown, however, that in March 1868, more 
than a year before the law came into effect, drafts were discussed within the 
Ministry of Education.36 
In spite of the military discussions on the need for better education, the mili-
tary authorities did not come forth with concrete proposals. In the documents of 
the Ministry of Education, there were neither letters from the k.u.k. (imperial 
and royal) Ministry of War nor the k.k. (cisleithanian) Ministry of National 
                                                             
34  Lecture by Hasner von Artha for Emperor Franz Joseph, December 31, 1868, ÖStA-AVA, UM-
Präs., 772/1868 and in ÖStA-AVA, UM-Präs., 108/1869. 
35  Information received via email from the Austrian Academy of Sciences, January 18, 2017 as 
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Defense to be found. The lack of documents on the Reichsvolksschulgesetz in 
the inventory of the military authorities themselves is also striking; especially 
seeing as how high-ranking military men presented the Emperor with a statistic 
shortly after the defeat against Prussia, according to which only 31 percent of 
the Austrian soldiers could read and write (Schilcher 2009, 123). Despite this, 
far-reaching demands for remedial measures were missing. A basic lecture held 
by Hasner von Artha on December 31, 1868, only two and a half years after 
Königgrätz, to Emperor Franz Joseph shows, however, that military necessities 
played an important role in the drafting of the law. As the state now has the 
authority to reform the school system, Hasner concluded, a comprehensive 
educational reform must still be passed in the current session of the House of 
Representatives.  
The more clearly it is recognized that the increase of the nation’s prosperity, 
the improvement of its moral conditions and the increase of its military 
strength depends on the success of the elementary school, the more important 
it is not to deceive oneself that a great deal still has to be done in order to 
bring the Austrian school system up to the same level, which other countries 
have already achieved and which they are restlessly continuing to improve.37  
After this flaming plea, however, it took another two months before the Kaiser 
gave his consent to submit the draft to the House of Representatives on March 
1, 1869.38 
The Minister of Education Leopold Hasner von Artha submitted the draft of 
a new school law to the House of Representatives a mere day after the Imperial 
permission (Ebner 1969, 306). The draft was designed to be a break with the 
past and to remedy the education system’s previous deficiencies. It included the 
creation of an interdenominational elementary school, in which clerical super-
vision was replaced by state supervision. In addition, the draft prescribed an 
improvement in the teachers’ education and wages, which was an effort to 
make the profession more appealing. Finally, it included the introduction of 
eight years of compulsory schooling and the limitation of the class size to 80 
children (Mikschy 1949, 4, 10; Feldbauer 1979, 461; Scheipl and Seel 1985, 
55-61). Military institutions influenced the creation of the draft, which can be 
seen in the numerous ideas clearly inspired by the military sector. For example, 
classes for the schoolchildren are scheduled to begin in the fall, just like the 
service of newly conscripted recruits. Separating the schoolchildren according 
to their age was also an idea derived from the army (Schilcher 2009, 125-6; 
Schilcher 2012, 9, 60-2). As the Austrian educational expert Bernd Schilcher 
                                                             
37  Lecture by Hasner von Artha for Emperor Franz Joseph, December 31, 1868, ÖStA-AVA, UM-
Präs., 772/1868 and in ÖStA-AVA, UM-Präs., 108/1869. 
38  Note of the Ministry of Education, without date, ÖStA-AVA, UM-Präs., 108/1869. 
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emphasizes, the “50-minute units were inspired by drill exercises and the 
school bell signaling break time comes from the drill sergeant’s whistle.”39 
Hasner started the report on his motivation for the draft with a short introduc-
tion to the historical development of the Austrian school system and concluded 
that much still had to be done “in order to raise the standards of the elementary 
school to the level, which it must achieve to keep pace with modern times, and 
in particular meet the requirements of the national economy.”40 The Minister of 
Education did not give any indication of the military necessity to improve 
education. 
In-depth discussions of the draft were assigned to a denominational com-
mission on March 4. Four weeks later, it recommended adopting the law. The 
rapporteur of the committee, Dr. Dinkel, read the commission’s report at the 
beginning of the general debate on April 21, once again summarizing the rea-
sons for the new bill: “The elementary school should be the youth’s institution 
for their general education. The people’s level of education primarily relies on 
the state of these elementary schools, seeing as they are the only schools at-
tended by the majority of the youth. In Austria however, the elementary school 
has until now fulfilled this task insufficiently and only to a limited degree.”41 
The report of the denominational commission also contains no indications of 
military motives. 
Despite the urgent need for an educational reform, well recognized by many 
Members of Parliament, the bill encountered some resistance. Liberal and 
conservative forces were irreconcilably at odds. In a veritable Kulturkampf, 
numerous parliamentarians voiced federal, financial, and organizational con-
cerns, while the confessional and religious resistance weighed most heavily. In 
particular, representatives of the Catholic Church flatly rejected the equality of 
all denominations as proposed in the draft (Jellouschek 1969, 299-302). How-
ever, the general debate, which lasted until April 23, did not lack members 
proclaiming their advocacy for the bill, either. The defeat at Königgrätz, which 
had only been three years ago at that point, played an important role in the 
discussions; this can be deduced from the numerous military arguments that 
were picked up by both opponents and supporters of the law. Representative 
Schneider insistently advocated for the bill’s adoption and pronounced emphat-
ically: “This law seems to me, I say this quite definitely, to be a spiritual law of 
defense, which wards off the power of darkness and adorns the people with the 
                                                             
39  „Bildungsexperte Bernd Schilcher tot,“ Obituary by the ORF of May 30, 2015, 
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weapons of light; it is made to spread education and enlightenment.”42 The 
term “geistiges Wehrgesetz” (“spiritual military law”) was remembered and 
picked up again forty years after the passing of the law (Vierzig Jahre 
Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1909, 3). It symbolized the widespread feeling that, in 
addition to the army, the educational system too had to be reformed in order to 
eliminate the causes for the defeat of 1866. 
Even opponents of the draft like the Tyrolean deputy Josef Greuter expected 
nothing less of a new educational law than “the salvation of Austria’s future,” 
but doubted that the bill could meet this demand.43 In his speech, Greuter also 
referred to the “Prussian schoolmasters” thesis and ironically said: “By always 
saying, that the elementary school is most important, the elementary school 
teachers of Prussia have triumphed at Sadowa [Königgrätz], you will encour-
age teachers to wish that they, when they replace the generals at Sadowa, also 
receive the salary of a general.”44 Deputy Dr. Albert Jäger, who also opposed 
the law, spoke of a “school illness of our time” and of “an overestimation of the 
value of elementary school.”45 
Ultimately, the law’s advocates benefitted from the military necessities and 
the calls for a better education of the recruits, which came from within the 
army. For example, the representative Dr. Ignaz Karl Figuly von Szep con-
firmed the need for new regulations using military data.  
I have an official record of how many recruits among 100 can read and write, 
because this is tested during the medical examinations. This index is not unin-
teresting! In Lower Austria 96 out of 100 can read and write, in Upper Austria 
89, in Bohemia 68, in Silesia 62, in Salzburg 60, in Moravia 46, in Styria 50, 
in Galicia 4, in Bukovina 4, in Carniola 3, in Dalmatia 2.46  
The deputy Dr. Anton Ryger emphasized the population’s need for reform, 
which in his mind could not be denied. He explicitly pointed to the defeat 
against Prussia as having tipped the scales towards innovating the educational 
system: “It vibrates in the air, it shakes public opinion; from the farmer’s 
smallest child up to the highest classes, the need has become palpable, and has, 
especially since 1866, been loudly expressed everywhere and anywhere.”47 
At the end of the general debate, Minister of Education Hasner was respon-
sible for once again highlighting the advantages of the bill and proving the 
critics’ arguments wrong. In his detailed speech, he especially targeted those 
who had been admonishing to implement the bill for federalist or confessional 
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reasons (Ebner 1969, 309-16). Finally, Hasner also invoked military motives 
and stated:  
If we do not have a good elementary school, then we will never be strong [...]. 
Not only on the battlefield, but also in the field, which is farmed by the peas-
ant, the elementary school plays a decisive role everywhere. This will be eve-
ryone’s right, and it is why the poorest countries in particular need good 
schools.48  
Hasner’s speech was followed by thunderous applause and paved the way for 
the passing of the draft. The “Gesetz, durch welches die Grundsätze des Un-
terrichtswesens bezüglich der Volksschulen festgestellt werden” (“Law estab-
lishing the Principles of Education concerning Elementary Schools”) was con-
sequently adopted by the House of Representatives on April 24, 1869, with 111 
votes in favor and 4 votes against. The greater part of the opposition had left 
the Chamber before the ballot (Jellouschek 1969, 289). 
Subsequently, the bill had to pass the Austrian House of Lords. Their ap-
pointed commission also emphasized the merits of the new regulations and 
stated in its final report:  
If this draft is approved by the House and it obtains the imperial sanction, the 
political school constitution of 1805 will be replaced by a constitutional 
school policy, and the much-tested Austria, which has carried out its rebirth in 
the weapons through the new military law, will, by dint of the new educational 
law, carry out its resurrection in spirit. (Ebner 1969, 308) 
Again, the consonance of compulsory schooling and compulsory military ser-
vice was noticeable. The Reichsvolksschulgesetz thus acted as the geistiges 
Wehrgesetz (spiritual military law) of Austria. The discussions in the House of 
Lords did not last as long as those in the House of Representatives had and the 
military argument was hardly mentioned at all. Ultimately, the House of Lords 
agreed to the Reichsvolksschulgesetz on May 10, 1869. Four days later, Em-
peror Franz Joseph sanctioned the draft and expressed his hope, that the new 
elementary school “will provide the Fatherland with the wealth of knowledge 
and skill which, as history has taught, forms the strongest foundation of states’ 
and peoples’ power and prosperity.”49 The law was published in the law gazette 
under No. 62/1869 and came into effect at the beginning of the school year 
1869/70 (Jellouschek 1969, 289). 
Although the general debate mainly focused on other issues, primarily be-
cause of the liberal Bürgerministerium’s disputes with the conservative opposi-
tion, the military considerations ultimately played an important role in the 
adoption of the Reichsvolksschulgesetz. Most members of parliament seemed 
to remember the shock of the 1866 defeat. The first effects of the law were 
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already evident some years after its adoption. While in 1870 only 45 percent of 
all conscripts could read and write, in 1882 this figure had reached 67 percent 
(Mikschy 1949, 40). 
The Austrian press also made a connection between the defeat against Prussia 
and the passing of the Reichsvolksschulgesetz. The Deutsche Volks-Zeitung 
emphasized on April 30, 1869, that the “clerical teaching in Austria was hit on 
the head in Königgrätz” and that the new law “now goes into the right direc-
tion.”50 Later, the Salzburger Zeitung wrote:  
As the state can demand of every one of its citizens that he or she comply with 
both the tax obligation and its military service to the best of their ability, it 
must also be anxious to improve both aforementioned duties by the improve-
ment of its schools. There is no doubt that the government has taken these civ-
ic duties into account in the drafting of the school laws.51  
Other newspapers even perceived the law as a measure to prepare Austria for 
revenge against Prussia.52 Military newspapers however did not cover the pass-
ing of the law. 
The very progressive provisions nonetheless contained some disadvantages 
and vague phrasing, so that the theoretically compulsory education could easily 
be circumvented. Additionally, most of the requirements “resulted in threaten-
ing sanctions and understood the school to be a compulsory institution with the 
goal to secure socially and economically necessary qualifications” (Feldbauer 
1979, 462). The elementary school as a “disciplinary institution” thereby often 
had a distinct military character (Feldbauer 1979, 462), which had to have been 
in keeping with those members of the army that had advocated for an im-
provement of the youth’s discipline, patriotism, and strength of character. For 
years after its implementation, resolute opposition to the law prevailed, espe-
cially in ecclesiastical circles (Mikschy 1949, 37-40). The Catholics, in particu-
lar, advocated the repeal or amendment of the reform. As early as 1871, barely 
two years after the law came into effect, the Austrian government, in light of 
the ongoing criticism, was considering modifying some of the provisions. The 
idea ultimately did not receive a majority in parliament. But with the amend-
ment to the school law of May 5, 1883, some major points of the Reichsvolkss-
chulgesetz were revoked. Among other things, the amendment included special 
exemptions and allowed for taking the religious denomination into account 
when appointing senior teachers and school leaders (Vierzig Jahre 
Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1909, 24-35). 
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4. Conclusion 
In 2012, the Austrian education expert Bernd Schilcher emphasized that the 
Austrian Reichsvolksschulgesetz was primarily introduced for military reasons:  
It is not surprising that Austria was once again lagging behind and only a lost 
war against Prussia was the decisive reason to establish this copy of a German 
school institution. After the lost battle of Königgrätz in 1866, the high-ranking 
Austrian military officials tried again – this time with Emperor Franz Josef 
[sic]. Once more, they convinced the monarch that Prussia’s better schools, 
with eight years of compulsory education instead of six and classes sorted by 
age that had worked well for 48 years, and more efficient teacher training, led 
to victory over the far less educated Austrian soldiers. Therefore the answer 
was again: not a new army, but a new Reichsvolksschulgesetz 1869. (Schilch-
er 2012, 67)  
As has been shown, Schilcher exaggerates at this point. Austrian military forc-
es did not advocate educational reform directly. Though it is true that a close 
connection between the Battle of Königgrätz, the introduction of universal 
conscription, and, finally, the adoption of the Reichsvolksschulgesetz cannot be 
denied, this connection is less striking than Schilcher makes it seem. 
In fact, the Reichsvolksschulgesetz was the beginning of the modernization 
of the Austrian educational system, which had been long overdue, and was 
partly bolstered by military considerations. The deficiency of Austria’s school 
system had been widely acknowledged before 1866, but it took the unexpected 
defeat against Prussia to initiate comprehensive reforms. The supposed fact that 
it was the “Prussian schoolmaster,” who had brought about Prussia’s victory in 
the Battle of Königgrätz particularly spurred the reform effort. Consequently, 
both the military academic literature and military leadership relied on the say-
ing to back up their demands for a better education system. 
Although there is a lack of relevant archival sources on the development of 
the law, military motivations can be proven to have had an influence on its 
drafting. In his presentation to Emperor Franz Joseph, Minister of Education 
Hasner von Artha not only emphasized that better education would increase 
Austria’s prosperity and improve the people’s morality, he also stressed that it 
would strengthen the military. Instances of military authorities directly influ-
encing the development the Reichsvolksschulgesetz cannot be proven. At that 
time, the Ministry of War was much more concerned with the reform of the 
Military Penal Code. 
Ultimately, politicians used the military narrative in support of the draft. 
They even coined the term “geistiges Wehrgesetz.” The law was compared to 
the introduction of universal military service and both reforms were intended to 
ensure that the new Dual Monarchy regained international competitiveness 
after the Austrian defeat, militarily and economically. The preceding remarks 
have shown that the military considerations were not the decisive or sole mo-
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tives for reforming the Austrian educational system. They did however provide 
ammunition for the advocates of the reform and thereby helped to enforce it 
despite insistent resistance. The Austrian military also came forward with ten-
tative demands, not for progressive reasons, but out of pure self-interest: if the 
army once again wanted to compete with the other European armies, its sol-
diers had to have a uniformly high level of education. Knowing that such a 
transition could not be achieved overnight, the introduction of the 
Reichsvolksschulgesetz seemed like a good place to start. In the following 
years, the military repeatedly demanded improvements of the education system 
to meet the technical and tactical challenges facing modern mass armies 
(Obinger and Kovacevic 2016, 131-3). 
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